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DIVERSITY AND PERFORMANCE:
THE ELUSIVE LINKAGE
Abstract
Previous studies o.f the relationships between diversification and perfor..

m;:rnce·, ·" al-rnougn: ·valuab~e;

have

how .to improve performance.

f<rcusea on "achieve-a·-performance .. a:n:a -not

on

Furthermore, there is as yet no overall theory

that links divE!rsity and _performance.

The purpose of this paper is to propose

a crucial linkage and to show how this linkage can add significantly to our
understanding of performance in the diversified firm.

For the past thirty-five years product-mark.et diversification of large
firms has continued at a rapid pace.

Today, over two-thirds of the firms in

the U.S.A.- Fortupe 500 are highly diversified and similar patterns of diversification exist in Weste;n Europe and Japan (Rumelt 1974, Pavan 1972,
Thanheiser 1972, Pooley 1972, Channon 1977, Suzuki 1980).

As a consequence,

interest: in _the relationship between corporate diversification and financial
perform.Snee has grown am~ng practitioners, academics, and public policy makers.
Accompanying this interest has been a spate of research on the patterns
of diversification -and the determinants of performance in diversified firms
by the acade.m ic community.

Concurrently, consulting firms have been actively

promoting a varie,t y of approaches for managing diversified firms.
of these efforts have been. mixed at best.

The ·results

There is, as yet, no overall theory

that links diversification with J)erformance and the linkage, if any, remains
elusive.
The purpose of this paper is to propose a crucial linkage, which has
largely· been ignored_ in the literature on the relationship between diversification· and · performance; and to show how this approach can add significantly to
our managerial understanding in the diversified firm.
A BRIEF REVIEW OF RESEARCH ON DIVERSITY AND PERFORMANCE

The purpose of· this section is to review briefly the major academic research· stTeams; and· consulting frameworks relevant to the relationships between
diversity and performance.

Those readers unfamiliar with the area in general

or interested .in learning more about any specific topic shoultl consult the references listed.-. While significant literature exists in support of each of
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the streams of research outlined below, we will only reference and discuss the
seminal works in each area.
The

Strat~gY

of Diversification

Pioneering work by Chandler {1962) and Ansoff (1965) established the motivations for diversification and the general nature of the diversified firm.
Wrigley (1970) refined and extended Chandler's study by investigating the vaFor example, a firm might expand

rious options open to a diversifying firm.

into new areas linking technological or market charactistics of the new · business to current activities, or, alternatively, i t might diversify without regard to such relationships.

Building on the work of Chandler, Wrigley, and

others, Rumelt (1974,- 1977) investigated the relationships among diversification strategy, organizational structure, and economic performance.
_4ie~;

His- stu-

were based on a random sample of 246 firms drawn from the Fortune 500

during the period from 1949 through 1974.

Rumelt used four major and nine mi-

nor categories to characterize the diversification strategy of firms.

The

ma~

jor categories were single business, dominant business, related business and
unrelated business.

These categories provide a spectrum of diversification

strategies from firms that remain essentially undiversified to -firms that diversified significantly into unrelated areas.

Using statistical methods,

Rumelt was able to relate diversification strategy to performance.
lated diversification strategies

The re-

related-constrained and related-linked

(e.g., General Foods and General Electric) were f-o und to outperform the other
diversification strategies on the average.
to be the highest performing on the average.

The related-constrained was found
(In related-constrained firms

most component businesses are related to each other, whereas in related-linked
firms only one-to-one relationships are required.)

By contrast, the unrelated
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conglomerate strategy was found to be one of the lowest performing on the
average.
Recently Nathanson and Cassano (1982) conducted a statistical study of
diversity and performance using a sample of 206 firms over the years 19731978.

They developed a· two-dimensional typology for capturing diversification

strategy that refines R.umelt 's categories.

On one dimension they measured

lllarket diversity and on the other dimension they measured product diversity.
They found that returns (on the average) declined as product diversity inereased while returns remained relatively steady as market diversity increased.

However, they also found that size plays an important ·moderating

role on the relationships.

For both the market and product diversity, smaller

firms did . well relative to larger firms in categories marked by no dive_rsiUcation and in categories of extremely high diversification.

Larger firms . did

significantly better than smaller firms i1l the in-between categories -

those

characterized by i .ntermediate levels of diversification.
In both these studies linking diversification and performance (R.umelt and
Nathanson/Cassano) the· key point to note. is that choosing the generic strategy
of diver.s ifieation . (how much and what kind of relatedness) is key to achieving
performance.
Economic Characteristics of Individual Businesses
Few: would argue that the characteristics of the various industries in
which a firm participates and the position. of the firm's businesses in these
industries impacts overall firm performance.

For an interesting and readable

conceptual discussion of the influence of industry structure on performance
see Porter (1980).
Two studies. have in fact empirically validated these influences for diversified firms.

The widely discussed PIMS program of the Marketing Science

4

Institute (see Schoeffler, Buzzell, and Heany, 1974, for an introduction) has
shown that variables such as market share and relative product quality directly influence the profitability of constituent businesses in large diversified
firms.

More recently, Montgomery (1979) has examined the performance differ-

ences in diversified ffrms using the market structure variables of industrial
organization economics.

Montgomery found that diversified firms with higher

levels of performance tended to have well positioned businesses in industries
with "favorable" Dlarket structures.

Specifically, she found that a diversi-

fied firm's profitability depended on the average concentration and profitability of the industries in which it participated and the firmis average market share Within these industries.
In summary, for both studies (PIMS and Montgomery) the structure of the
industries . in which the firm competes and the competitive position of the
firm's businesses within these industries are the key determinants of performance.
Portfolio CQ.n cePts
What are hete called "portfolio concepts" go by various names such as
portfolio grids, SBU concepts, and SBU matrices.

The origin of these ap-

proaches is usually traced to the Boston Consulting Group, General Electric
Company, and McKinsey and Company.

Although there are numerous slight varia-

tions among the approaches used by various consultant groups and firms, they
all rely on a matrix or grid with two axes.

The matrix classifies businesses

by product-market attractiveness, or some variant of it, along one axis and by
competitive position or some variant of it along the other axis.
these matrices are divided into either four or nine boxes.
discussion see Hofer and Schendel, 1978.)

Typically

(For a thorough

The position (box) that each busi-

ness occupies represents its strategic position and determines the role that
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the business should play in the corporate portfolio.
ing degrees of cash generation or cash usage.

This role involves vary-

Studies by Bettis (1979), and

Haspeslagh (1982) suggest that managers use these concepts to varying degrees
as a tool to a dogma -- in managing a diversified portfolio of businesses.
For each variant o'f the portfolio concept the key points are:

(1) the

strategic position of each business determines its desired cash flow characteristic~;

and (2) it is the "balance" of these cash flow characteristics that

leads to overall performance of the . diversified firm.
The Human Relations School
In addition t .o the streams of research discussed above, a number of .studies focusing on performance in large firms by researchers concerned with organizational theory and human motivation, have appeared recently.

These stu-

dies do not consider the problem of diversity as i t affects performance in the
large organization.

Representative of' this line of research these are Peters

and Waterman (1982), Deal and Kennedy (1982), Pascale and Athos (1981) and
Ouchi (1981).

These studies often draw directly or indirectly on some of the

approaches that are believed to have been significant in the development of
successful Japanese firms.

In all of these studies there is a great .d eal of

emphasis on achieving a high and · sustainable level of motivation among the entire management team and work force.
The four streams of research lead to somewhat different conclusions.

To

summarize, the linkage between diversity and performance would appear to be a
function of:

Summao/
1.

The generic diversification strategy adopted by the firm, or

2..

the quality of the individual businesses, as measured by the
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competitive structure of the industry and the strength of
that firm in that industry, or
the cash flow characteristics of the various businesses

3.

and the internal cash flow balance for the total firm, or
the corporate ·culture and the level of motivation of the

4.

employees -

the desire for excellence.

Undoubtedly, all the four perspectives provide partial answers to the quesThe difficulty in using the results of the research streams outlined

tion.

above arises from the following:
1.

They focus attention on and document characteristics associated with
'achieved' performance, not on how to 'improve performance'.

In

other words, it is a static view.
2.

They do not deal with the problems of 'how to diversify', but only
on performance given a pattern of diversification.

3.

They focus on performance measures like ROC, ROE, or cash flow, one
at a time but not on performance of the business as a whole (includ-·
ing factors such as technology and product leadership, good community
and government relations, people management, etc.).

While we are

very cognizant of the intractability of some of these performance
measures and the difficulties in including them in a meaningful research design, we should however, recognize their managerial importance.
The Importance of "Quality of Management":
Bettis, Hall and Prahalad (1979) have argued that, if we moved away from
the traditional research preoccupation with central tendencies, but focus on
outliers -

the very high and very poor performers -

the elusive linkage between diversity and performance.

we may learn more about
{Peters and Waterman,
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1982, represent this type of study.

Unfortunately they did not explicitly

address the problem of diversity nor couple the study of high performers with
a study of low performers.)

By studying just twelve firms, six of which were

high performers and six low performers, across the three generic categories of
dominant, related, and unrelated diversifiers (with a sample of four firms
each, two in high and two in low performance categories), they concluded that
the quality of management was as critical in explaining performance as any
other factor.

The study was not based on the large sample (and it could not

be by design, as their concern was with outliers), and the conclusions were

tentative.

The real departure in the academic perspective on diversity and

performance indicated by the study was the concern with very good and very
poor performances in the same generic diversification category and the _inclusion of importance of the quality of management as a major variable linking
diversity and performance.
Two other studies indicate the importance of the quality of management in
managing diversification.

Ranjan Das (1981) studied one firm's attempt to di-

versify out of the core business (tobacco) and how it had to learn the process
of general management in the new businesses into which it ventured.

The con-

clusion was that it was not the quality of the businesses -- its competitive
structure -

or the pattern of diversification per se that determined early

failures and success later, but the evolution of the top management and its
ability to acquire new skills and recognize that its approach to managing a
diversified firm must be different from the way it had managed the single
business firm.

The study by Miles (1982) of tobacco companies in the US and

their attempts to diversify away from tobacco, also leads to a similar conclusion.

The firms had to learn as much about general management in the

diversified firm, as a distinct process and skill, as the characteristics of
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the new businesses.

Both these studies indicate that the work of top manage-

ment in diversified firms is a distinct skill and can contribute to the success or failure of anyone of the businesses within the firm or the firm as a
whole.
The Management of a Diversified Firm
Studies of the work of top management and the process by which they manage a diversified firm are not numerous.

Bower (1972) demonstrated that top

managers influence the strategic choices made by unit level managers by orchestrating the organizational context -

the formal structure and systems.

In other words, the tools of top management were administrative in character.
Hammermesh (1977) outlined the process by which top managers intervene in a
divisional profit crisis.

Prahalad and Doz (1981) outlined, in detail,· hoW

top managers can use administrative tools to shift the strategic direction of
a business.

This line of research established both the broad scope of the

work of top management, but more importantly on how that influences the strategic choices made by lower level managers at the business unit level, thereby
impacting on the overall performance.

There exists a logical, though not cur-

rently empirically verified link between the quality of management and the
performance of the firm.
The two questions that we posed ourselves based on the literature were:
1.

If top managers in single business firms had to learn the process of
managing a diversified portfolio, should top managers in diversified
firms go through a similar learning process when they add new businesses?

Is the task of top management in the diversified firm de-

pendent on or at least partially influenced by the underlying strategic characteristcs of the businesses?

- - - - - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - ------ - - - - - -
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2.

If the tools available to top managers in diversified firms to influence the strategic direction of businesses are essentially administrative as it affects the organizational context, does it follow
that the substance of businesses are irrelevant?

In other words, can

the same context management capabilities suffice i f the mix of businesses change?
These questions are motivated by the fact that current models that link
diversity and performance do not shed light on issues like i) why do some 'obvious winners' fail?,

ii) why do some 'obvious losers' succeed?,

if any, are the limits to the management of diversity?,

iii) what,

and iv) how does an

organization learn to cope with diversity?
We will provide some examples that illustrate the dilemmas faced by
practi.tioners and researchers concerned with the diversity-performance linkage.
Examp.l~s

of . 'Obvious .Wi,nrters' . Losing

- Johnson and Johnson, with a diversified portfolio of drugs,
toiletries, hygienic products, baby care products, and industrial products entered the disposable diaper business during 1973.
The company was totally identified with baby care, and had an
enviable distribution capability. However, by 1981, it exited
the business, unable to sustain itself in the disposable diaper
business • . (Source: Johnson and Johnson Annual Reports, 1973,
1981.)
Texas Instruments (TI), a leader in semiconductors, entered
the digital watch business during 1975. The aggressive price
cutting strategy followed by TI convinced several observers
(Business Week, 1975) that TI would bring leadership in watches
back to the US. However, it exited the business in 1980.
(Source: Business Week, October 27, 1975.)
- Philip Morris, known as an aggressive marketer, acquired 7-Up
during 1978. lt paid, as it did with Miller Brewing, what was
considered a high price ($515 million, which was 20 times earnings). As of 1982, 7-Up had lost its market share from 6. 6% in
1975 to S.O% by 1982, in spite of the fact that Philip Morris had
spent, by published accounts, at least $60 million. However,
Miller Brewing was considered a spectacular marketing (if not a
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financial) achievement. Market share increased from 4.5% in
1971 to 21% in 1982. (Source: Mergers & Acquisitions, Fall
1978.)
- EMI, a British firm with a firm base in entertainment and defense electronics, was the first to develop a CT scanner during
1970. It was an instant success. By 1975-76, it was a world
leader and had more than 70% market share in the US. Almost 40%
of all radiological research papers presented at conferences in
the US were based on EMI's CT scanner. However, by 1980, the
firm had to exit the business. It was unable to exploit the excellent market position it enjoyed.
- American Can purchased Pickwick International, a firm involved
in distributing records. Pickwick was a leader, the second largest in the US with a very profitable history. When it was acquired in 1977, for $101.6 million, as part of American Can's
strategy for moving into consumer businesses, it was very profitable. Within two years, there was significant profit and market snare decline. (Source: Mergers and Acquisitions, Fall,
1977.)
- Hueblein, a very successful liquor marketer, acquired Hamm
Brewerie.s , during 1965, for $62 million. In spite of the
extraordinary success of Heublein, Hamm was very unsuccessful.
Hamm was divested for $6-10 million, during 1973. Similarly,
Heublein's acquisition of Kentucky Fried Chicken and Stouffers
frozen foods, have not been spectacular successes. (Source:
Heublein Case, 1966.) ·
These examples include diversification through internal development and
acquisition, situations where technology or marketing synergy or both existed.
The acquired businesses had very attractive market positions, and the acquiring firms were well known for the quality of management, as evidenced by their
'

success prior to these acquisitions.

Now to some counter examples •••

Examples of Obvious Losers' Winning
,- General Electric ventured into fina.n cial services businesses
in a big way, away from customer credit to industrial leasing.
It was a totally "unrelated" activity - by our current definitions of relatedness. However, the financial services business
has become one of the fastest growing and most profitable of
GE's businesses. As of 1982, GE credit accounted for 7.3% of GE
sales and 11.3% of GE profit. (Source: GE 1982 Annual Report.)
- Rolm, a small manufacturer of defense computers, branched off
into PBX market during 1973. At that time Rolm's sales were
$3.6 million. It challenged AT&T (AT&T·' s market share of PBX
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was conservatively 12.5%), GTE and other such firms several times
By 1980, Rolm had gained 80% of PBX market share and
it~; size.
was considered a leader. (Source: Rolm Corp., Stanford Business Case, 1979.)
- Honda, a fi .rm with annual sales of a small fraction of General
Motors, with primarily a position in motorcycles, entered the
fiercely competitive auto-market, first in Japan in 1962 and in
the US during 1971·. While by all standards the auto-market was
a (a) low growth, (b) capital intensive, (c) concentrated
(dominated by GM and Ford), and (d) technology intensive, Honda
was able to establish a secure and profitable position and even
initiate US production by 1982.
We could enlarge the number of examples.
!sting theory, should have failed.

Here are examples that, by ex-

Either they represented unrelated divers!-

fication, or the parent was cash starved, or the firm had to contend with a
very unfavorable market structure.

While these examples do not disprove ex-

!sting wisdom, it certainly raises doubts on the adequacy of our models.
THE ELUSIVE LINKAGE
Based on our exploratory research, we find that most top managements operate with a single or a s.e t of dominant . general management logic(s)

A

dominant logic is the way management conceptualizes the business and makes decisions.

In essence, it is the mindset and repertoire of tools that top man-

agement uses to identify, define, and make strategic decisions.

These tasks

of general management relate to resource allocation, control over operations,
the ability to detect impending crisis or emerging potential, and the ability
to intervene in a particular business to resolve a crisis.

The tasks are per-

formed by the use of administrative tools like planning, budgeting, rewards
and punishment, career management, organization structure changes, etc.

The

dominant logic evolves because (see Exhibit 1) the traditional or largest
business (i.e., the "core" business) tends to dominate the thinking and actions of top management.

Top managers focus their energies on the tasks that

12
are critical for success given the characteristics of the core business.

This

in turn causes them to see problems in certain ways and to develop familiarity
with and facility in the use of those tools that are particularly useful in
accomplishing the critical tasks of the core business.

In other words, the

tasks critical for success in the core business tends to establish top manage ...
'lilent 's

minds~t

and repertoire of . tools.

This mindset and repertoire of tools

then furthers a focusing effect on those particular characteristics of the
core business that define the critical tasks for success.

Often, top managers

confronted with wide differences in the demands of businesses tend to group
them, under a group or sector management, based on strategic similarities
among the businesses so grouped.

The examples of General Electric Company

and Textron, indicate that the dominant logics required of businesses w:f.thin a
sector or a group tend to be similar.
sectors.

In other words,

~bile

They may be quite dissimilar across

the dominant logics across businesses may be

quite varied, firms like GE effectively reduce the variety by grouping similar
businesses together, thus limiting, for all practical purposes, the variety at
the top management level.

Further, strategic direction of specific businesses

tend to be managed at the sector level, which represents a collection of busi ...
ness with similar strategic logics.
The need to change the dominant logic may arise from two distinct forces:
the acquisition or development of a new business with a different dominant
logic or the rapid changes in the structure of the core business (see Exhibit
2).

This paper focuses primarily on the first of these forces -

new businesses.

addition of

However, much of the argument is equally applicable to rapid

changes in the structure of the core business.

Interestingly, the authors

believe that because of the rapid pace of change in the competitive milieu
(e.g., technological ad'17ance, globalization, and increasing government
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intervention in many countries) many large companies are currently forced t .o
cope with changes in dominant logics.
and the US auto industry.

Consider, for example, General Motors

With dramatic structural changes occurring in the

auto industry, (globalization, market share shifts, emergence of stringent
regulations on emmissions, safety, fleet mileage requirements, and joint ventures), the mindsets required to manage the firm tend to be quite different
from those which led to success during the 60's and early 70's.
In the case o.f US Steel, the firm has to cope not only with the dramatic
shifts taking place in the steel industry worldwide, but at the same time cope
with the need to integrate Marathon Oil, an acquisition outside its core business, and a business with entirely different industry characteristics and
strategic itDperativ:es.

Moreover, the oil industry was also undergoing struc-

tural change as of 1981 .... 1982.

US Steel had to, therefore not only cope with

the new dominant logic forced by changes in the steel industry, but at the
same time understand and cope with those imposed by its acquisition of Marathon Oil.
When a t .o p management acquires or internally develops a new business, the
dominant logic required of that business may correspond with the logic of the
existing businesses.
Gener~l

Some firms operate with a single dominant logic (e.g.,

Motors) and some others with multiple dominant logics (e.g., General

Electric).

If the new business does not correspond to the existing dominant

logic(s) of the firm, a new logic has to be developed, i.e., the top management has to create an organizational and administrative · basis for learning the
unique needs of that business and ensuring that it will not be sub.1ect to the
same logic that may have worked in existing businesses.

In other words, top

managers must ask themselves, in addition to the financial, technological and
marketing "fits" of the new business, whether it fits the dominant logic(s)
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currently used by them.

This need for identifying and classifying businesses

is captured in exhibit 3.

If the new business falls in cell (A) then there is

no need to reexamine the processes of management within the firm.

However, if

it does not, and falls into cell (B), then, top managers will have to establish a differentiated basis for dealing with that business.

IBM, for example,

created an independent business unit (IBU) to handle the Personal Computer
business and even geographically separated it.

However, once top managers

felt that it had taken root, they moved it back into the mainline of IBM's
business.
If the business falls in cell (C), then the task of top managers is to
identify and group that business with other businesses, within the firm, using
similar strategic logic.

This will be the equivalent, in General Electric or

3M of assigning it to a sector.

However, if it falls into cell (D), then, it

may merit the same separate treatment as in cell (B).
The Importance of Key Individuals:
Implicit in our discussion of dominant logic so far is the role of top
management.

We view top management not as a "faceless abstraction" but as a

collection of key individuals.

The mindsets, the repertoire of skills, the

ability to read and adapt to weak signals, the determinants of the dominant
logic(s), an organization is capable of, is in essence the variety that key
individuals (and a coalition of individuals) can cope with in a large organization.

There is a significant body of research in

psy~hology

and artificial

intelligence that we can draw on to understand how an individual's capabilities to solve complex problems are developed.
We have categorized the streams of research into two groups -

the pro-

cesses by which reinforcement of a world view takes place and the processes of
complex problem solving.

The framework used is shown in exhibit 4.

We will
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briefly examine the various streams of research to explicitly deal with the
sources of dominant logic used by a top manager.
The S.o urces of Dominant Logic
We identified four streams of research - operant conditioning, paradigms,
cognitive biases, and artificial intelligence - that collect! vely may help us
understand the various facets of dominant logic and how top managers can expand their repertoire of skills.
Skinner (1953) in his seminal work on operant conditioning, argued that
behavior was a function of its consequences.

Behavior could be understood by

considering the contingencies that were administered by the environment in response to certain behaviors.
frequently in the future.

Behavior that was reinforced was emitted more

By contrast, behavior that was ignored or punished

(negative reinforcement) was likely to diminish over time.

A dominant logic

can be seen as resulting from the reinforcement that results from doing the
"right things" with respect to a business.

In other words, when top managers

effectively perform the tasks that are critical for success in the core business they are positively reinforced by economic success.

This reinforcement

results in their focusing effort on the behaviors that led to success.
they develop. a particular mindset and repertoire of tools.

Hence,

This in turn de-

termines the approaches that will be taken to resource allocation, the detection of impending crisis or emerging opportunity,. control over operations, and
the approach to intervention in case of crisis or unexploited opportunity.
Consider what happens, however, if the firm acquires or develops a business
for which the critical tasks for success are substantially different from
those in . the core business.

Here, because of operant conditioning the emitted

behaviors are likely to remain those that are appropriate for the core business even though they may be inappropriate in the new business.

In other
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words, it will be difficult for a top management group to be effective when a
new dominant logic is required.

The problems faced by American Can and Exxon

in managing acquisitions of businesses totally different from their core businesses, in the early stages, is an illustration of the power of operant conditioning on top management.
The concept of dominant logic also derives direct support from Kuhn's
(1970) work on scientific paradigms and Allison's (1971) work on the importance of alternate paradigms in the context of analyzing government actions
during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Kuhn, a historian of science, argued that a particular science at any
point in time can be characterized by a set of" shared beliefs" or "conventional wisdom" about the world that constitutes what he called the "dominant
paradigm."

What 'Kuhn calls "norrilal science" is carried out efficiently under

this set of shared beliefs.

In a sense, Kuhn's "paradigm" is simply a way of

defining and managing the world and a· basis for action in that world.

It

specifies what is a legitimate part of the science and what are legitimate approaches to doing science.

Kuhn points out how difficult it is to shift domi-

nant paradigms and illustrates this with several examples such as the shift
from the Ptolemaic view of the universe (earth centered) to the Copernican
view of the universe (sun centered) in astronomy.
a business firm is simple and direct.

The analogy from science to

The dominant paradigm and the dominant

logic are conceptually similar but employed in different fields.
Allison used paradigmatic analysis to show how the'adoption of a particular paradigm powerfully effects our evaluation of events.
paradigm as

·~a

He characterized a

systematic statement of the basic assumptions, concepts and

propositions employed by a school of analysis."

Different paradigms resulted

in dramatically different analyses of his chosen example:

the Cuban missile
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crisis.

The parallel between Allison's use of the word paradigm and our use

of dominant logic is obvious.
As part of the development of "intelligent" computer programs there have

been numerous efforts to develop chess playing programs.
Simon, 1972, for a review.)

(See Newell and

Inevitably such research has required intense

studies of how chess experts mnake decisions in a chess game.

In particular,

the decision making and problem solving of grandmasters and masters has been
compared to that of lesser player (de Groot, 1965).

These studies have ehown

that the better players could remember more "patterns" of previous games than
the lesser players.

Simon, (1979) estimated that class A players could remem-

ber about 1300 familiar patterns while masters or grandmasters remember about
50,000.

This "vocabulary" of previous games lets players make effective de-

cisions by comparison with earlier games.

In other words, chess players de-

cide on the basis of experience or "what worked before," not on the basis of
some best strategy or optimizing procedure.

Now consider a situation where

the design of the gameboard or rules of chess are changed.
ulary" of games is no longer as useful in this new game.

The stored "vocabSimilarly, when the

economic game board or rules are changed by a diversification move, the
vocabulary of economic moves stored through experience in the core business is
no longer as useful.

In other words, solutions based ·on "past experience" or

solution by "analogy" may be inappropriate.
A final area · from which research results are suggestive of the concept of
a dominant top management logic is cognitive psychology;

The psychology of

cognitive biases is the study of how people in making decisions sometimes make
systematic (and often severe) errors (See Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, for an
introduction and survey).

When dealing with uncertain and complex tasks

people often rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which greatly
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simplify the decision process.

In general, these heuristics are useful, but

on some occasions they can result in significant errors.
For present purposes the most interesting of these heuristic principles
is what is called the availability heuristic.
1973, for a thorough discussion.)

(See Tversky and Kahneman,

Basically, the availability heuristic leads

people to make decisions by using information that can easily be brought to
mind (i.e., information that is "available").
systematic errors.

This often leads to severe and

This field of research also suggests that decision makers

do not necessarily use analytical approaches to evaluate the information content of available data or search for "adequate information" (Nisbett and Ross,
1980).

For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) point out that one may assess

the risk of heart attack among

middle~aged

people by recalling such occur-

rences among one's acquaintances even if it can he shown that it is an inappropriate basis for drawing such a conclusion.

Obviously, for top managers,

knowledge of the core business and the business they are most familiar with
will be a significant source of available information.

They tend to apply it

to other businesses where it may or may not be appropriate (Das, 1981).

Re-

search on cognitive processes suggests that the mindset and repertoire of
tools that constitute the dominant logic are likely to be inappropriately applied by managers confronted with a "different" business and that there is
significant "learning" that precedes change in those biases.

The difficulty

of operating in diverse businesses which require multiple dominant logics is
obvious.
We have so far argued that a key determinant of successful diversification

be it through acquisition or internal development -- is the fit

be~

tween the dominant logic that the new business demands and the logic(s) that
the top management of a diversifying firm is capable of.

In other words,
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central to our view of the determinants of high performance in a diversified
firm, are the following ideas:
i)

the ability of a top management group to accept the need for
grouping businesses based on strategic similarities (as distinct from technical or market similarities) and create the
capabilities to manage them differently.

ii)

The recognition that a dominant coalition of top managers
influence the dominant logic(s) of the organization. This
implies that the capabilities of a firm to cope with diversity may be restricted or enhanced by the quality of the top
management team. The composition of that team may be critical.

iii)

'the recognition of the importance of key individuals. As an
indiVidual, the variety of dominant logic(s) that a manager
is capable of is a function of his past experiences (i.e.,
the number and patterns of moves he can recognize), as well
as his career path to top management and the reasons he perceives for his success (i.e., operant conditioning). While
these two factors determine the range of logics he can cope
with, dependence on conventional wisdom (i.e., paradigms) in
contrast to the ability to use varied analytical approaches
and ability to tap a wide variety of sources of data to cope
with substantive and organizational problems (i.e. , cogniti ve biases) may lind t his ability to expand his skills.
The implication is that the more varied the backgrounds of
top managers, less are the chances that they will depend on
a singly dominant logic. Further, the greater the desire of
key managers to expose themselves to new sources of data as
well as new analytical approaches (a learning orientatio.n ),
less is· the danger of a single dominant logic being applied
across dissimilar businesses.

The composition of the top management team and how it copes with diversity,
we believe, is an important determinant of performance.

Top managers can re-

strict diversity by opting out of some opportunities in the interest of a
focus" or expand their skills and capabilities to accommodate a "wider variety."

CONCLUSIONS
The concept of dominant strategic logic and the role of top managers in
understanding and managing the logic(s), are important

aspec~s

to be
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considered in the research on diversity and performance.

There are several

implications of including the concept of dominant strategic logic in the study
of diversity and performance.
1.

We will list some:

Limits to Diversity:
We have argued that the "real diversity" in a firm does not arise
from the variety in technologies or markets per se but from the strategic
demands the businesses impose on top management
nant logics.

or the variety in domi-

Further, the variety of dom1nant logics that a top man&ge-

nent can handle depends on the composition of the team, their experiences,
as well as their attitude toward learning.

These factors suggest that we

ought to recognize that the limit to the diversity of businesses within a
firm is determined by the strategic variety and that the strategic ·variety
that a firm can cope with is dependent on the composition of a top management team.

In other words, each top management team, at a given point in

time, has an inbuilt limit to the extent of diversity.
2.

Diversity and Performance:
A high level of performance in a diversified firm requires the ability to "respond fast'' to competitor moves as well as "respond appropriately."

One of the itttplications of our thesis so far, is that top managers

are less likely to "respond appropriately" to situations where the dominant logic is different as well as not respond quickly enough as they may
be unable to interpret the meaning of information regarding unfamiliar

businesses.

The "hidden costs" associated with diversifying into nonfa-

miliar businesses is shown schematically in exhibit 5.

These "hidden

costs" are not explicitly recognized when the overall business climate is
very favorable.

The problems surface when the newly acquired businesses

(which are stra;tegically dissimilar) encount.e r competitive problems or are
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faced with a profit crisis.

Top managers find themselves unable to re-

spond to the crisis (Hammermesh, 1977).
3.

I'm?roving Performance in Diversified Firms:
The prescription for improving -performance in diversified firms follows two distinct routes.

One, top managers may have to reduce the stra-

tegic variety in the businesses within the firm -- what has come to be
known as "focus" in the portfolio.

Secondly, top managers may attempt to

enhance their skills and enlarge the range of dominant strategic logic(s)
they are capable of coping with.
"how fast" and "by what
4.

This process raises questions such as

~ans."

The Meatd.ng ()f "Relatedness:"
The concept of related or conglomerate diversification was typically
based on an analysis of the technological and market characteristics.

The

view presented here suggests that we may have to -develop a concept of relatedne~s

based on the "strategic similarities" of businesses coupled with

the unique capacities associated with a specific top management team, to
manage a variety of dominant logic(s).

This view of "relatedness" is not

totally independent of the top management team in a diversified firm.
The relationship between diversity and performance remains elusive.

Ex-

plicitly recognizing and incorporating the concepts developed in this paper,
may help our understanding of this linkage.
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